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Abstract  
Corporate governance is not a new concept. In fact the last 15 years has seen a surge in academic 
publications and case law in relation to the lack of corporate governance. Research Gap is that 
Company Directors are attending a “mad hatters’ tea party” when it comes to the implementation of 
governance codes, with the recent spate of court cases involving breaches of directors fiduciary duties. 
Methodology used was review of case law using archival data. This research looks at the type of case 
law issues of corporate governance in Australia and in particular accountability, and relates the case 
law to the Corporations Act (2001) to find where company directors are getting corporate governance 
wrong. The findings indicate that perhaps the “if not why not” prescription, should not be an option 
for corporate governance for some Boards. For some Boards the invitation from Alice to jump down 
the rabbit hole into creative accounting and bad board behaviour at the “mad hatters’ tea party” is 
just too great an incentive. Implications show that this review of important corporate governance case 
law will assist Boards to concentrate their efforts on improving the environment they operate in, as 
good governance equates to good business.  
“In another moment down went Alice after it, never once considering how in the world 
she was to get out again.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 
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1. Corporate Governance Introduction  
Corporate governance refers to the relationship among different participants, and defining the 
corporation’s direction and performance, which includes the CEO, i.e., the management team, the 
board of directors, and the shareholders (Prasad, 2006). From the agency perspective, corporate 
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governance is “a system of law and sound approaches by which corporations are directed and 
controlled focusing on the internal and external corporate structures with the intention of monitoring 
the actions of management and directors and thereby mitigating agency risks which may stem from the 
misdeeds of corporate officers” (Sifuna & Anazett, 2012). Separation of ownership and control in the 
modern corporations became an issue by Berle and Means (1932). Recent research shows that there are 
lots of concentrations of ownership among the largest American companies (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), and that a relative higher level of ownership 
concentration exists in other developed and developing countries outside the US (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). 
Corporate governance has been the subject of extensive scrutiny and controversy, particularly after the 
corporate collapses of the 2000s and the recent global financial crisis. Much of the controversy started 
in the Western countries, inspired by the early study of Berle and Means (1932). This classic analysis 
of corporation control call into question the justification for shareholder wealth and raise a problem of 
social ethics. But Berles’ observation shows a lack of empirical justification for the claims held by the 
shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) advocate the financial theory of risk-bearing which hinges on 
the separation of decision management and residual risk-bearing in the corporation. This separation and 
specialization of decision management and residual risk-bearing leads to an agency problem between 
agents and principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The governance problem is that those who bear the 
residual risk have no assurance that the managers will act in the shareholder best interests, and 
therefore bring in the costs of monitoring and preventing the exercise of such discretion described as 
agency cost. The pre-occupation for corporate governance then is to mitigate the agency problem and 
agency cost between shareholders and managers. One of the possibilities is to use corporate governance 
as the mechanism for governing including boards of directors and to ensure sustainability through the 
financial structure as proposed by Jensen (1986). 
The World Bank defines corporate governance as the set of mechanisms available to shareholders for 
influencing managers to maximize the value of shareholder’s stock and to fixed claimants for 
controlling the agency costs of equity. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defines corporate governance as a set of relationships among management, company board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Both of them imply the principal-agent model of the corporation, 
and emphasise the importance of shareholder interest and company value. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
define corporate governance as a set of mechanisms to assure financiers that they will get a return on 
their investment. Corporate Governance then is an evolving concept. It dates back to the Code of 
Hammurabi back in 1800BC when bartering traders agreed to the basic rules of business transactions. 
The following table shows some of the international corporate governance regimes currently in place. 
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Table 1. Timeline  
Date Document Name Date Document Name 
1800 BC Code of Hammurabi 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 
1991 Bosch Committee – Corporate 
Practices and Conduct (1995) 
2001 Ramsay Report (Australia) 
1992 Cadbury Committee Report (UK) 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (US) 
1993 Hilmer Report (Australia) 2003 Combined Code Corporate Governance 
(UK) 
1995 Vienot Report (France) 2003 ASX Good Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice 
1995 Toronto Stock Exchange 
recommendations on Canadian 
Board practices (Canada) 
2003 
2004 
AS 8000 - 2003 Standards (Australia) 
CLERP 9 Act 2004 (Australia) 
1996 Report on Corporate Governance 
in Hong Kong  
2004 Corporate Governance in New Zealand 
Principles and Guidelines  
1997 King Report (South Africa) 2010 Corporate Governance Principles & 
Recommendations 2010 Amendments 
(ASX) 
1997 Netherlands Report (Netherlands) 2012 UK Corporate Governance Code 
1998 Hampel Report (UK) 2017 Amendments as necessary 
1998 Olivencia Report (Spain) 2019 Corporate Governance Principles & 
Recommendations 2019 Amendments 
(ASX) 
 
2. Method 
This research uses archival data to compare current case law activities to that of the prescribed 
Corporation Act 2001 and the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019). It also uses 
case studies of each of the case law to develop an in depth analysis of the case to enable the comparison 
to be made to legal obligations of Corporations Act 2001 and the Corporate Governance 
recommendations by the ASX (2019), as described by Creswell and Creswell (2018). 
Countries that have good corporate governance systems become not only attractive locations for 
domestic companies to develop and invest (La Porta et al., 1998), but also for foreign investors, and 
thus promote economic growth (Levine, 1999). However, corporate governance practices are different 
from country to country. Companies in different countries are operating in different social, cultural, 
legal and economic environments, as a result, each country has developed its own corporate 
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governance system that serves its business operations best (La Porta et al., 1998). This paper 
investigates the most significant cases that have helped to shape the current corporate laws in Australia 
in relation to corporate governance. It also shows the link between the directors’ duties as imposed by 
law (Corporations Act 2001) and the Australian Securities Exchange corporate governance 
recommendations (2019) that listed companies must comply with.  
“How puzzling all these changes are! I’m never sure what I'm going to be, from one 
minute another.” Carroll, Lewis(1865), “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”. 
This leads to the Research Problem of “How have the Corporations Act (2001) for company directors 
duties and the corporate governance regimes recommended by ASX (2019), been complied with by 
listed companies in Australia in the last 10 years”. Research Question 1: Can the directors duties 
outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) relate to the Corporate Governance recommendations by the 
ASX (2019)? Research Question 2: What directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in court 
activity in the last 15 years? To address the research problem, an organised, systematic and logical 
process of research method, using secondary data will be used. The use of archival data involves the 
research into case law of court cases involving the Corporations Act (2001) breaches.  
 
3. Results 
In order to answer Research Question 1: “Can directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) 
relate to the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019)” directors duties must be 
investigated in terms of the specific references in the Corporations Act (CA) 2001 legislation. The 
difference between Common Law duties and Equitable Fiduciary duties must be ascertained, and 
specifically linked to a section of the act. Directors duties are broken down into Common Law duties 
and Equitable Fiduciary Duties. Under the Corporations Act (S185), there are specific sections on 
directors’ duties, such as S180 Reasonable care and diligence, S181 Good faith and proper purpose, 
S182 Conflict of interest, S183 Confidential information, S184 Criminal liability, S588G2/3 Insolvent 
Trading and Personal liability, and s1043A Insider trading.  
Specifically then under common law duties, a breach of section 180 Reasonable Case and Diligence or 
section 181 Good faith and proper purpose, will result in the use of section of S588G(2) which will 
result in personally liable penalties. Under the equitable fiduciary duties section of the Corporate Act 
(2001), section 182 conflict of interest and section 183 confidential information will able be in breach 
of director duties. Other penalties under the act include Criminal liability (s184), as well and other 
breaches such as Insolvent trading S588G (3) and Insider Trading (S1043A). 
The commonwealth government recognises that all of these laws place a heavy burden on directors, 
and has encouraged the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to review these in light of state 
legislations. Nicholson and Underhill (2012) discuss the “Personal Liability for Corporate Fault 
Reform Bill” that imposes personal liability on company officers for offences committed by 
corporations. The reforms came from the 2009 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) which 
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intends to harmonise corporate wrongs with personal criminal liability. This has been replaced by the 
Miscellaneous Acts Amendment (Directors’ Liability) Act No. 2, 2011 (NSW) (2011 Act) and was 
subsequently replaced by the Miscellaneous Acts Amendment (Directors’ Liability) Act 2012 (NSW) 
(2012 Act), which commenced on 11th January 2013. 
Particularly after the corporate collapse era of 2000s, many countries have adopted some form of 
governance code such as that of the Corporate Governance Council of Australia, with their Best 
Practice Recommendations for listed companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (2019). 
Although these are recommendations only, for listed companies in Australia, listing rule 4.10 dictates 
that companies must address each of these governance initiatives, and explain if they have not adopted 
the recommendation (if not why not). In particular for listing companies in Australia it is important to 
link the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019) to that of their Corporations Act 
(2001) obligations as shown in Table 2.  
In order to answer Research Question 1: “Can directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) 
relate to the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019)”, Table 2 suggests there is a 
direct link between the application of the good governance recommendations by the ASX (2010) and 
the application of the Corporations Act (2001) for any breaches of those recommendations by directors. 
Directors therefore should be aware that even though the governance recommendations have an “if not 
why not” regime, that a breach of the recommendation can be directly linked to a breach of the 
Corporations Act (2001) which could lead to criminal or civil personal liability for Directors actions. 
“I don’t think... “then you shouldn't talk, said the Hatter.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice 
in Wonderland”. 
 
Table 2. ASX (2019) and CA (2001) 
ASX 2019  Corporations Act 2001 
1: Solid foundations for 
management & oversight 
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180, Good faith and proper 
purpose S181 
2: Structure Board to be effective 
and add value 
Personally Liable S588G(2) 
3: Instil a culture of acting 
lawfully, ethically & responsibly 
Criminal Liability S184, Reasonable Care and Diligence S180 
Personally Liable S588G (2) 
4: Safeguard integrity of corporate 
reports 
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180 
5: Make timely and balanced 
disclosure 
Conflict of Interest S182, Confidential Information S183 
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180 
6: Respect the rights of security 
holders 
Insolvent Trading S588G (3), Insider Trading S1043A 
Good Faith and Proper Purpose S181 
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7: Recognise and manage risk Insolvent Trading S588G (3), Insider Trading S1043A, Good 
Faith and Proper Purpose S181. Reasonable Care and Due 
Diligence S180, Conflict of Interest S182, Confidential 
Information S183 
8:Remunerate fairly and 
responsibly 
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180 
 
In order to answer Research Question 2: “What directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in 
court activity in the last 15 years?” the following tables have been divided by sections of the 
Corporations Act in relation to breaches of directors duties, and then linked to the corporate governance 
recommendations.  
 
Table 3. Personally Liable S588G (2) 
Case Name Breach of Law Companies Act  
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
v Friedrich 5 ACSR 115: 9 ACLC 
946 
S588G(2) director found to be personally liable for debts incurred 
by the company, as the loan was fraudulent and he should not 
have signed annual report. ASX 2 & 3 breach. 
ASIC v Narain FCAFC 120 Misleading information regarding chemicals and claims it could 
stop spread of disease that was not backed up by medical advice. 
Managing director held personally liable for the statements 
588G(2). 
ASX 3 breach. 
 
Table 4. Good Faith and Proper Purpose S181 
Case Name Breach of Law Companies Act  
R v Byrnes and Hopwood (1995) 
183 CLR 501; (1995) 130 ALR 
529 
Court found that officers could still be in breach of duties even 
when they thought it would benefit the company, but for an 
improper purpose S181. ASX 1 & 7 breach. 
ASIC v Rich44ACSR 341: 21 
ACLC 450-One.Tel 
Non-executive chair failed to act with proper case and diligence, 
it also deals with the business judgement rule S181. ASX 1 & 6 
breach. 
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Table 5. Confidential Information S183/Insider Trading S1043A 
Case Name Breach of Law Companies Act  
R v Firns 51 NSWLR 548: 38 
ACSR 223 
Held that it is was insider trading under s1034A as the 
information was publically available even if no one had observed 
it. ASX 6 breach. 
ASIC v Southcorp Wines 203 ALR 
627: 22 ACLC 1 
Contravened continuous disclosure rules by communicating the 
analysts before notifying ASIC S674(2), S183. ASX 3 breach. 
R v Rivkin 198 ALR 400: 45 
ACSR 366 
Insider trading held s1043A as information that was material and 
not publically available was used to buy shares. Court imposed 
detention and a fine. 
ASX 3 & 7 breach. 
ASIC v Wizard 145 FCR 57: 219 
ALR 714 
Insider trading breach s183, S1043A in that information obtained 
as a director that was not publically available was used for their 
own purposes to purchase shares in other companies (even though 
they made losses). Fined $400,000 and disqualified from being a 
director for 10 years. ASX 3, 6 & 7 breach. 
 
Table 6. Minority Shareholder Rights S136 
Case Name Finding/Description  
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001 
Gambotto v WCP 182 CLR 432: 
127 ALR 4147 
Minority shareholder case where a proposed amendment to the 
constitution and subsequent compulsory acquisition was invalid. 
To avoid administration and taxation costs was not a valid and 
proper purpose S136. ASX 6 breach. 
 
Table 7. Reasonable Care and Due Diligence S180 
Case Name Finding/Description  
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001 
AWA Ltd v Daniels t/as Deloitte 
Haskins and Sells 7 ACSR 759 
Problems with delegated authority and incorrect procedures for 
reporting to a company board. An equal duty of care for both 
executive and non-executive directors. That all should be familiar 
with the business of the company. ASX 1 & 7 breach. 
Vines v ASIC 55 ACSR 617: 23 
ACLC 1387-GIO 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) duties of care and diligence, S180 
negligence, and lack of due diligence in forecasting made public. 
ASX 4 breach. 
The Bell Group Ltd (in Directors duties to consider the interests of creditors in a 
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liquidation) v Westpac Banking 
Corporation (No 9) [2008] 
WASC 239 
restructure for corporate debts. Banks were also found to assist in 
the directors breach of duties and were fined.  
ASX 3 breach. 
ASIC v Narain FCAFC 120 Misleading information regarding chemicals and claims it could 
stop spread of disease that was not backed up by medical advice. 
Managing director was held personally liable for making the 
statements. ASX 7 breach. 
Jubliee Mines NL v Riley 253 ALR 
673: 69 ACSR 659 
Continuous disclosure should be balanced with no misleading or 
deceptive conduct. Principle of “when in doubt disclose” should 
be considered carefully as company should not also mislead the 
market with incomplete information. ASX 5 breach 
ASIC v Healy 2011 FCA 717      
Centro Case 
S180(1) directors breach as inaccurate financial accounts were 
approved. ASX 4 breach. 
ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group 
Ltd FCAFC 19 
Held FMG and Managing director Andrew Forrest breach of 
continuous disclosure for engaging in misleading or deceptive 
conduct concerning ASX releases and investor briefings to the 
signing of framework agreements with Chinese companies. In 
2012 this was overturned on appeal. ASX 5 breach. 
 
Table 8. Insolvent Trading S588G(3) 
Case Name Finding/Description  
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
v Friedrich 5 ACSR 115: 9 ACLC 
946 
S588G(2)/((3) director found to be personally liable for insolvent 
trading for debts incurred by the company, as the loan was 
fraudulent and he should not have signed annual reports with 
assets listed that the business did not own. ASX 1 & 3 breach. 
ASIC v Plymin 46 ACSR 126: 21 
ACLC 700. Elliott v ASIC 10 VR 
369: 205 ALR 594. 
Breach of statutory duty to prevent insolvent trading. Under 
s588G requires individual directors take reasonable steps to 
prevent a company from incurring a debt. Banned from being a 
director and fined $25,000 and $15,000 respectively. ASX 4 & 7 
breach. 
 
“If everybody minded their own business, the world would go around a great deal faster 
than it does.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice in Wonderland”. 
Research Question 1: Can the directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) relate to the 
Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019) are demonstrated by Table 2. The 
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Research Question 2 of what directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in court activity in the 
last 15 years, has been shown by Tables 3-8. 
 
4. Discussion  
Figure 2 is a model based on the interactions between Directors duties as prescribed by Corporations 
Law (2001) and the ASX Good Governance Recommendations (2019) and court cases from the 
breaches. Entitled the LAG/LEAD model, it represents how company directors can avoid the court 
system by instead of being reactive (LAG) they can be proactive (LEAD) by exhibiting good corporate 
governance and compliance with Corporations law.  
 
 
Figure 2. LAG/LEAD Model for Company Directors 
 
The Business Judgement Rule s180(2) states that officers of a company are compliant with S180(1) if 
they made a judgement in good faith for a proper purpose, they do not have any material personal 
interest, they inform themselves about the subject matter to a reasonable level and they rationally 
believe that the judgement is for the best interests of the corporation. Bryans (2011) discusses the 
James Hardie case in relation to non-executives breaches of care and diligence in relation to ASX 
announcements that were misleading and failing to request a copy of the announcement. In the Centro 
case for example, Giordano stated (2011) that the directors failed to exercise their statutory duty of care 
and diligence in approving inaccurate accounts s180(1), statutory duty of care and diligence, s344(1) 
(reasonable steps to comply with financial reporting duties) and s601FD(3) in the failure of classifying 
$1.75 million USD as non-current when in fact they were short-term liabilities. In 2010 Heath in 
discussing the ASIV v Rich cases (2009) stated that directors are not responsible for unforeseeable 
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risks, and a mistake or judgement of error does not automatically invoke s180(1) breaches, however 
Directors still must understand company’s financial statements, a responsibility that cannot be avoided.  
The answer to the Research Problem of: “How have the Corporations Act (2001) for company directors 
duties and the corporate governance regimes recommended by ASX (2019), been complied with by 
listed companies in Australia in the last 10 years?,” would be that every ASX governance 
recommendation (2019) and every company directors duty imposed by Corporations Law (2001), has 
in the last 15 years been breached resulting in a court case, with either criminal or civil liabilities 
imposed, so there is a lack of overall compliance by listed companies in Australia.  
Directors’ duties then are imposed on all Directors of all entities with serious consequences for 
breaches both on a civil or criminal basis. This research has shown that corporate governance may 
mean different things to different entities, but the Corporations Act (2001) is applied to ALL directors 
of ALL entities. Directors should be made aware of these obligations. Adams (2004) describes 
corporate governance as being not unlike a beauty and a beast, and that Directors who wish to do 
“good” should carry out diligence, compliance with regulation and adhere to corporate governance 
recommendations. All these recommendations however only add more to the burden already held by 
Directors both paid and voluntary. Directors of all Boards then, need to be vigilant, aware of their 
obligations, fully informed and ethical in all decisions they make for and on behalf of their boards, the 
last thing they want to see is their company in the courts, and their decision questioned by a judge.  
“My dear, here we must run as fast as we can, just to stay in place. And if you wish to go 
anywhere you must run twice as fast as that.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice in 
Wonderland”. 
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